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According to several theories of humour (see Berger, 2012; Martin, 2007), incongruity – i.e., the presence of two
incompatiblemeanings in the same situation – is a crucial condition for an event being evaluated as comical. The
aim of this research was to test with psychophysical methods the role of incongruity in visual perception by
manipulating the causal paradigm (Michotte, 1946/1963) to get a comic effect. We ran three experiments. In Ex-
periment 1, we tested the role of speed ratio between the ﬁrst and the second movement, and the effect of
animacy cues (i.e. frog-like and jumping-like trajectories) in the secondmovement; in Experiment 2, wemanip-
ulated the temporal delay between the movements to explore the relationship between perceptual causal con-
tingencies and comic impressions; in Experiment 3, we compared the strength of the comic impressions
arising from incongruent trajectories based on animacy cues with those arising from incongruent trajectories
not based on animacy cues (bouncing and rotating) in the second part of the causal event. General ﬁndings
showed that the paradoxical juxtaposition of a living behaviour in the perceptual causal paradigm is a powerful
factor in eliciting comic appreciations, coherently with the Bergsonian perspective in particular (Bergson, 2003),
and with incongruity theories in general.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction: the comic appeal of incongruity
From Aristotle to Kant, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Freud and many
other thinkers, philosophers and scientists have always been fascinated
by humour, and have tried to understandwhat humour is or why some-
thing looks funny. The ability to perceive it is “instinctive” and universal,
and recent evolutionary theories claim that it is likely to rely on a genet-
ically based neurological substrate (Polimeni & Reiss, 2006).
Because of themultilayered nature of humour, involving cognitive as
well as social and emotional human competences, several different
theories of humour have been developed. The most widely accepted
nowadays in experimental psychology is incongruity theory, formulated
by Koestler in 1964 (Berger, 2012; Martin, 2007). Incongruity theory,
dating back from Aristotle's Rhetoric, and then further developed by
Kant, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, emphasizes the crucial role of in-
congruity in humour appreciation. Incongruous events can take place
on different dimensions, such as linguistic, logic, related to identity or
to action (Berger, 2010, 2012; Deckers, 1993; Martin, 2007; McGhee,
1979; Rothbart, 1976; Rothbart & Pien, 1977; Shultz, 1976; Suls, 1972;
Veatch, 1998). Speciﬁcally, the aim of the research reported in this
paper is to see if incongruity theoriesmay be investigated in the percep-
tual ﬁeld, by manipulating the causal paradigm introduced byMichotte
(1946/1963) to assess if paradoxical visual contingencies are effective in
eliciting comic impressions.
According to Koestler (1964), incongruity involves the juxtaposition
of two incongruous frames of reference— that is, the simultaneous pres-
ence of two contradictorymeanings. Following this theory, the violation
of an expected pattern may provoke humour in the observer.
This happens, for instance, with the perceptually plausible – but
ecologically impossible – events that we see in many visual puns or in
animated cartoons, as in the classical sketches of Walt Disney's movies.
In these situations incongruity often takes place between the ﬁrst phase
of the event, which creates an expectation coherent with mechanical or
bio-mechanical laws, and the second phase, in which this expectation is
not met. We can evoke, for instance, the scene in which Mickey Mouse,
on the baseball diamond, winds up to throw the ball and provokes such
a vigorous action as to be propelled into the air like a helicopter. Or we
can think of the surprising elastic-like stretched body of Mickey Mouse
when Peg Leg Pete pulls him, or of the sudden change of a cow into a
barrel organ1 (see Figs. 1 and 2). So it seems reasonable to assume
that causal violations do have the power to prompt a comic reaction.
One critical point of the incongruity approach is that not all incon-
gruities are funny (Shultz, 1976; Suls, 1972); according to the theory
of humour formulated by Henri Bergson, another philosopher
who can be identiﬁed with the incongruity theory (Berger, 2010), a
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disproportion of causality is not a sufﬁcient condition to get comicality
(Bergson, 1900/2003). More precisely, one of themost comic incongru-
ities, Bergson suggests, is the perception of an animate or psychological
behaviour embodied in a mechanical structure, maintaining that “any
arrangement of acts and events is comicwhich gives us, in a single com-
bination, the illusion of life and the distinct impression of a mechanical
arrangement” (Bergson, 1900/2003, p. 45). For instance, an inanimate
object always elicits humour when it evokes human behaviour (e.g. a
puppet, or the jack-in-the-box trick), and, vice versa, human behaviour
becomes funny when it exhibits mechanical attributes. Following
Bergson, it would therefore seem that a speciﬁc kind of incongruity,
the one in which causal incongruities are juxtaposed to psychological
features, should be generally appropriate to elicit the impression of
comic.2
1.1. Perception of causality, animacy and Michotte's experimental
paradigm
Causal incongruities, intended as mechanical disproportions as well
as inconsequential social contingencies, can be accidentally observed in
everyday life or intentionally framed up in event perception, as in the
case of cartoons, every time spatiotemporal contingency uniﬁes two
different events in one unitary incongruous conﬁguration.
According to the gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker (1935/1969) (see
also Bozzi, 1969, 1990), two discontinuities – in a homogeneous ﬁeld –
close in the temporal dimension, are spontaneously grouped and, para-
doxically, causally related one to the other. This happens, for instance,
when a gust of wind suddenly shuts the door and in the same instant
a light comes on in the opposite side of the hallway. We know that
there is no causal relationship between the two events, however we
perceive a cause–effect relationship even if it is “implausible”, so crucial
is the temporal coincidence (Duncker, 1935/1969).
Starting from Michotte's (1946/1963) and Heider and Simmel
(1944) seminal demonstrations, a large body of researches investigated
the basic spatiotemporal conditions leading to causal perception. Even if
causality and animacy are typically associatedwith higher levels of cog-
nitive processing, there is now considerable agreement that the detec-
tion of causal relationships is rooted in the early visual processes, as it
appears to be: largely automatic, irresistible, resistant to higher-level
beliefs and intentions, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-
driven visual cues (see the review by Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000;
Costall, 1991; Hubbard, 2013a, 2013b; Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble,
1987; Opfer & Gelman, 2010; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983;
Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Wagemans, Van
Lier, & Scholl, 2006; White, 1995). Moreover, the visual system seems
speciﬁcally tuned for discriminating mechanical and social contingen-
cies “in order to detect the presence of (physical or social) information
in the local environment that cannot be deductively inferred, but that
is of critical importance to ourﬁtness and survival” (Scholl &Gao, 2013).
Michotte and his followers have studied the laws of causal percep-
tion with a phenomenological approach, introducing an experimental
paradigm known as launch effect (Michotte, 1946/1963): a ﬁrst square
Amoves towards a second stationary square B. After the contact, square
A stops and square B starts tomove along the same trajectory, butwith a
slower speed.We perceive this event as amechanical collision, inwhich
themotion of the second object B appears to be caused by themotion of
the launcher A, as if ‘pushed’ forward.
As a matter of fact, temporal contingencies in the interaction of sim-
ple geometrical shapes can lead to two different perceptual outcomes,
i.e. mechanical collisions or social causality, depending on whether the
Newtonian principles are respected or violated (e.g. Gelman, Durgin, &
Kaufman, 1995; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006), or in relation to the
2 Ejzenstejn (2004) applies this hypothesis to his analysis of theWalt Disney's animated
cartoons (see Parovel, 2012).
Fig. 1. Taken from: Walt Disney Treasures— Behind the Scenes at Walt Disney Studio, 2002/1956, “The plausible impossible”. © The Walt Disney Company.
Fig. 2. Taken from “Steamboat Willie”, the short ﬁlm produced by the Walt Disney Production in 1928. © The Walt Disney Company.
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presence of animacy cues in the trajectories (Schlottman & Surian,
1999; Schlottmann, Ray, & Cownie, 2006). So, even incongruent events,
in which the two movements are heterogeneous or in some other way
inconsequential, but close in space and in time, are always uniﬁed in a
causal structure, qualitatively dependent on the global arrangements
(see Parovel & Casco, 2006).
In the trigger effect (Michotte, 1946/1963), for instance, the sequence
between the movement of the ﬁrst square and the movement of the
second one fails to respect the mechanical laws of collisions, as the sec-
ond object is much faster than the ﬁrst. Consequently, the movement of
the second square has an active and self-propelling character, qualita-
tively very different from the “pushed-like” passive motion of the sec-
ond square in the launch effect (Michotte, 1946/1963; see Thinès,
Costall, & Butterworth, 1991). Incidentally, when Michotte described
the trigger effect, he reported in a note that it looked comical. He brieﬂy
explained this effect in terms of a disproportion between theﬁrst and the
second part of the event, the cause and the effect.
Successive researches exploring the trigger display showed that the
perception of a “living” behaviour could be enhanced by varying the spa-
tiotemporal structure. For instance, if the second object B is much faster
than A, like in the trigger event, but begins to move before contact, it
seems clearly “escaping” from the ﬁrst, effect named “intentional
reaction” (Kanizsa, 1991; Kanizsa & Vicario, 1968) andmore recently “so-
cial causality”, or “psychological causality” (Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth,
& Hesketh, 2002). Observers spontaneously report that the second object
“runs away from the ﬁrst”, like “to avoid him”, or “because it is afraid”.
Another animacy cue which can effectively interact with perceptual
causality is the motion of non-rigid expanding and contracting squares,
suited in generating a powerful impression of caterpillar-like or frog-
like locomotion, as observed ﬁrstly by Michotte (1946/1963) and later
by Schlottman and Surian (1999) and Schlottmann et al. (2006), who
showed that the non-rigid agent produces an increase in the number
of attributions of social causality and animacy (Schlottmann & Ray,
2010). By the way, non-rigid deformations are also very close to Walt
Disney's animation technique named “squash and stretch” (Thomas &
Johnston, 1981), used to enhance the funniness of cartoons.
Other animacy or intentionality cues are, for instance, the C-shaped
or S-shaped path of the trajectory (Blythe, Miller, & Todd, 1996, 1999;
Gelman et al., 1995; Stewart, 1984), self-propulsion (Csibra, 2008;
Dasser, Ulbaek, & Premack, 1989; Markson & Spelke, 2006;
Schlottmann & Ray, 2010), synchronous movements (Bassili, 1976), in-
creased acceleration and/or heading (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000),
speed and direction changes (Träuble, Pauen, & Poulin-Dubois, 2014)
and certain patterns of approach or avoidance (Dittrich & Lea, 1994;
Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Gao & Scholl, 2011; Pavlova, 2012;
Schultz, Friston, O'Doherty, Wolpert, & Frith, 2005), or by mimicking
the motion of naturally occurring stimuli (Schultz & Bülthoff, 2013).
Moreover, in the absence of acceleration, it has been demonstrated
that an object travelling at a relatively faster constant speed is more
likely to be perceived as animate (Szego & Rutherford, 2007; Visch &
Tan, 2009).
Other researchers investigated the emotional attribution of dynamic
minimal expressive stimuli, and their relationship with genre recogni-
tion (Visch & Goudbeek, 2009; Visch & Tan, 2009). Visch and Tan
(2009) adopted a basic chase scene between two abstract blocks, and
varied the chasing object with respect to ﬁve parameters: velocity,
efﬁciency, ﬂuency, detail, and deformation. Interestingly, in their exper-
iment animacy does not signiﬁcantly correlate with emotion ratings,
including funniness. Emotional responses (funny, sad, impressive, and
scary) were however found to be related to genre categorization
(i.e., comedy, drama, action, and non-ﬁction) and with some of
the movements parameters considered. With respect to funniness, it
seemed to be related to either very low or very high levels of directness
of the chaser's track (i.e. efﬁciency) and of bodies deformation; to low
levels of ﬂuency smoothness of velocity transitions and to high levels
of temporal density of velocity changes (i.e. detail).
1.2. The current study
All these causal demonstrations are generally fascinating and sur-
prising to observe, because of their paradoxical and “living” character,
but in which measure and in which conditions are they also funny, as
Michotte noted? Apart from his incidental observation, so far there
have been almost no empirical investigations about the emergence of
comical effect in the perception of launching paradigm. At the same
time, it would seem that Michotte's experimental display is particularly
appropriate to generate causal contingencies that are incongruent with
respect to a mechanical launch, potentially involving both the percep-
tion of social causality and animacy, and the perception of merely me-
chanical incongruities. This could, in turn, allow comparing different
theories of humour by testing speciﬁc predictions derived by them
with psychophysical methods, relative to the perception of surprising
causal events, with or without the clear impression of a psychological
behaviour embodied in a mechanical structure.
One previous exploratory experiment carried out by Bressanelli and
Parovel (2012) supported this proposal. This research showed that in-
congruity between cause and effect provokes a comic impression if
the two geometrical objects are perceived as animate agents, whereas
if a mechanical incongruity is perceived between cause and effect, the
event can generate a surprise reaction, but the comic impression is gen-
erally weaker. Bressanelli and Parovel tried variously shaped objects
and differently-shaped trajectories in the second part of the causal
event (i.e. the effect), and found that a “jumping-like” shape of the
path was judged an animated motion and obtained the higher results
in terms of comicality.
The aim of our research was to broaden previous results and inves-
tigate with different psychophysical methods the role of causal incon-
gruities based on animacy cues in the Michotte's launching paradigm
to get a comical effect. We run three experiments. In Experiment 1,
we tested the role of the speed-ratio between the ﬁrst and the second
movement and the effect of incongruities based on animacy cues in
the second movement; in Experiment 2 we manipulated the temporal
contingency by varying the duration of the delay between the end of
the ﬁrst movement and the beginning of the second movement to
check if the comic effect is strictly dependent on the perception of
causality or not; and ﬁnally, in Experiment 3, we compared the strength
of the comic impressions arising from incongruent trajectories based on
animacy cues with those arising from incongruent trajectories not
based on animacy cues in the second part of the causal event.
2. Experiment 1: the role of the speed-ratio and animacy cues
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the role of the speed-
ratio between the two movements in launching paradigm, and the ef-
fect of the presence of animacy cues in the movement of the second
square, i.e. a frog-like expanding and contracting motion and a rabbit-
like jumping trajectory, in the emerging of comic impressions. Varying
the speed-ratio in linear trajectories, moreover, we obtained both the
optimal stimulus conditions of the Michotte's launching paradigm,
where the ﬁrst movement is faster than the second, and the stimulus
conditions of the trigger paradigm (Michotte, 1946/1963), in which
the second movement is faster than the ﬁrst. In this way we could also




Participants were 15 university students (11 females). Mean age of
the participants was 23.6 years (SD = 2.6 years). All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
24 G. Parovel, S. Guidi / Acta Psychologica 159 (2015) 22–32
2.2. Design
The stimuli were designed starting from the launching paradigm
(Michotte, 1946/1963), where one square moves towards a second
square, which appears to be ‘pushed’ away by the ﬁrst. We varied this
conﬁguration by modifying the shape of the trajectory of the second
square in two different ways, in order to obtain three main stimulus
conditions: 1) linear trajectory; 2) frog-like expanding and contracting
trajectory; and 3) rabbit-like jumping trajectory (see Fig. 3). For each
of these conditions, 4 versions were generated by varying the speed of
each square on two levels (slow, fast) independently. This resulted in
12 stimuli corresponding to all the possible combinations of 3 factors:
the trajectory of the movement of the second square (3 levels), the
speed of the ﬁrst square and the speed of the second square (2 levels each).
The experiment included a total of 132 trials, consisting of two rep-
etitions of all the 66 pairwise comparisons of the 12 stimuli. The order of
presentation of the stimuli was balanced across repetitions (i.e. given
stimuli A and B, A was presented before B in the ﬁrst repetition A, and
after B in the second). The trials were presented in randomized order
(within each repetition) and grouped in four blocks of 33 trials each.
2.2.1. Stimuli
The stimuli were short Quicktime®movies, of variable duration de-
pending on the experimental conditions (from 1000 ms to 5000 ms).
The ﬁrst frame of each movie was the same, consisting of identical two
black squares (side = 0.5°) inside a white rectangle (width = 12.2°,
height=8°) placed at the centre of the screen against a grey background.
The squares were aligned along the horizontal midline of the rectangle.
One square was horizontally displaced towards the left, so that it's left
side was 3.8° away from the vertical midline of rectangle. The second
square, instead, was slightly displaced to the right, so that its left side
was laying along the vertical midline of the offset rectangle.
At the onset of the stimuli, the ﬁrst square started to move horizon-
tally towards the right with constant speed (on a straight path), stop-
ping when its right side became adjacent to the left side of the second
square. After a 30 ms delay, the second square started moving towards
the right, stopping after the distance travelled horizontally was equal to
the distance travelled by the ﬁrst square (i.e. 3.8°), which remained still.
The speed of the slow moving squares was 2°/s and the one of the fast
moving ones was 12.6°/s.3
The stimuli were presented on a LED laptop monitor, with a screen
measuring 11 in. diagonally, and participants viewed them from
approximately 57 cm, with unrestricted head and eye movements.
2.2.2. Procedure
Participants were initially instructed about the nature of the task.
They were told that on each trial they would see two simple movies,
one after the other, and that their task was to choose which one had
seemed more comical to them.
At the beginning of each trial, the ﬁxation cross was presented on a
grey background for 1500 ms. When the cross disappeared, the screen
remained grey for another 500 ms, and then the ﬁrst movie was
presented and played. After the ﬁrst movie stopped, the squares were
removed and the white rectangle remained empty on the screen for
other 1500 ms, before the second movie was played. After the second
movie stopped, the screen turned grey again, and instructions were
displayed to the participants, asking them to press the left key if they
considered the ﬁrst movie to be more comical, and the right key if
they thought the second movie was more comical. At the end of each
block of trials, participants were given the opportunity to take a short
break before proceeding to the next block.
Stimuli presentation and data recording were controlled using
PsychoPy2 v1.80.01 software running on a MacBook Air.
2.3. Results
Paired comparisons data were ﬁrst analysed using the Thurstone–
Mosteller scaling method (Mosteller, 1951; Thurstone, 1927a, 1927b),
in order to derive relative “comicality” values for each of the 12 stimuli.
Scale values were estimated ﬁtting a generalized linear model
(Critchlow & Fligner, 1991) to the data, using the “thurstone” function
of the R package “eba”. Conﬁdence intervals for the scale values were
also computed using the empirical formula proposed by Montag
(2006).4 The results of the scaling are plotted in Fig. 4(a) as function
of the speed of the squares, and of the trajectory of the second square.
As can be seen in the plot, all the stimuli in which the speed of the
second square was low (open symbols) are located in the lower half
of the comicality scale, as opposed to the stimuli in which the speed of
the second square was high (ﬁlled symbols). Moreover, for each given
speed of the second square and type of trajectory, the stimuli were
more comical when the ﬁrst square moved fast (triangles) than when
it moved slowly (circles).
Fig. 3. Schematic illustrations of the stimuli adopted in Experiment 1: (a) linear trajectory;
(b) frog-like expanding and contracting trajectory; and (c) rabbit-like jumping trajectory.
3 The speed along the articulated trajectories were approximately adjusted taking into
account the different shapes of their paths, so that the second square appeared to have
roughly the same speed of the ﬁrst one, which moved on a linear trajectory.
4 Given that n is the number of stimuli, and N the number of presentations
of each pair times the number of subjects, according to Montag (2006) the stan-
dard deviation of the scale values can be computed using this formula:
σobs = 1.76 ∗ (n + 3.08)−0.613(N − 2.55)−0.491.
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Beside speed, also the trajectory of the second square seemed to de-
termine comicality. For each given combination of speed for the squares,
in facts, rabbit-like and frog-like trajectories were perceived as more
comical than linear ones, although the effect seems only signiﬁcant
when the second square moved fast.
The statisticalmodel exhibited a goodﬁt to the data, and the log like-
lihood ratio test was not signiﬁcant [G2(55) = 73.06; ns], showing the
existence of signiﬁcant differences between the comicality of the stimuli
(as opposed to no differences— Critchlow& Fligner, 1991). To verify the
degree of individual variability in the perception of comicality, we also
computed scale values for each participant. Out of 15 subjects, 12 exhib-
ited signiﬁcant preferences. The scale values for all the participants are
plotted in Fig. 4(b–p), which allows verifying that, although comicality
values of the stimuli did vary across observers, in most cases we can
ﬁnd either one or more of the effects that were evident in Fig. 4(a).
Only the subjects for which the analysis did not reveal signiﬁcant pref-
erences (i.e. participants 6, 12, and 15) showed a different pattern of
comicality values. In one case (subject 15) the range of the scale values
is extremely compressed, suggesting that this observer did not perceive
the stimuli as comically different. In the other cases the observers con-
sidered the linear trajectory more comical than the other two, either
when the second squaremoved fast (subject 6) or when it moved slow-
ly (subject 12).
To check whether there were differences between males and fe-
males in the perception of the comicality values of the stimuli we
followed the procedure showed by Duineveld, Arents, and King
(2000). In this procedure, likelihood ratio tests are used to compare a
scalingmodel5 having all theparameters (i.e. the scale values) restricted
to be equal across groups (i.e. amodelwith a single set of parameters) to
Fig. 4. Plots of the comicality values of the 12 stimuli as function of the speed of the squares and of the trajectory of the second square. Filled symbols represent stimuli inwhich the speedof
the second square was high, and open symbols represent stimuli in which it was low. Circles represent stimuli in which the ﬁrst square moved slowly, and triangles represent stimuli in
which itmoved fast. In (a), the values estimated using PC data from all the observers are plotted, with error bars representing conﬁdence intervals. In (b–p), the scale values estimated for
each observer separately are plotted.
5 In this procedure, the stimuli scale values are derived ﬁtting Bradley–Terry–Luce
models (Bradley, 1984; Luce, 1959),which are slightly different fromThurstone–Mosteller
models, although they yield very similar scale values on a ratio scale.
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a more complex model allowing the parameter to vary freely across
groups (i.e. one set of parameters per group).
The likelihood-ratio test showed signiﬁcant differences between
male and females [G2(11) = 97; p b 0.0001]. However, when scale
values were derived separately for females and for males, only the
model for females exhibited a good ﬁt to the data, as well as signiﬁcant
differences in the perceived comicality value of the stimuli. For males,
conversely, the scaling model did not ﬁt well the data, although signiﬁ-
cant differences were found in between the stimuli comicality values.
Wemust however, notice that the lack of ﬁt of the lattermodel could re-
sult from the limited number of male participants in the experiment.
Moreover, all the 3 participants for which the Thurstone models did
not ﬁt well were males.
No differenceswere found instead in the perceived comicality values
as function of the age of the participants. Wemust however notice that
the limited sample size and the limited range of ages represented in the
sample do not allow drawing deﬁnitive conclusion about whether or
not age affects the comicality of the stimuli.
2.4. Discussion
The results of the ﬁrst experiment seem to show that the introduc-
tion of animacy cues in the launching paradigm, for which the second
movement is shaped as a life-like trajectory, increases the impression
of comic. This effect is signiﬁcantly greater in both the frog-like and
rabbit-like trajectories, with respect to the reference case of a linear
trajectory.
Moreover, the results seem to support an important effect of speed,
in intensifying the amusing effect of animacy cues, and also in getting a
funny impression even with linear movements, when the two move-
ments are both fast, andwhen theﬁrstmovement is slower that the sec-
ond one. Michotte's observation about the comicality of trigger events,
therefore, is conﬁrmed here. The launching paradigm, in which the
ﬁrst object moves faster than the second, as in a mechanical collision,
was not judged comic at all. Surprisingly, the trigger condition seems
less funny than the condition in which both squares moved at the
same high speed.
We propose two possible explanations for the effect of speed: ﬁrst,
the trigger condition may produce an impression of animacy because
it displays a violation of Newton's mechanical laws, in that the pushed
object has more kinetic energy than the preceding one; second, high
values of speed might be themselves a cue of animacy, as other authors
reported (see Szego & Rutherford, 2007). Consequently, when the two
movements have the same velocity, but are both fast, they appear
more alive that when they are both slow. We must notice, however,
that even with low velocity values in both themovements, the addition
of an animacy cue seems to enhance comicality.
In summary, three factors appear relevant in getting an amusing im-
pression: the incongruity between the shapes of the two trajectories;
the animal-like movement of the object (i.e. the non-rigid expanding
and contracting locomotion or the jumping movement); the high
value of speed.
Individual differences in the estimations of comicality, lastly,
indicate that observers do not respond exactly in the same ways at the
critical variables manipulated in the experiment, coherently with the
literature on humour (see for instance Ruch & Hehl, 1998; Ruch &
Köhler, 1998; Ruch, 2001). However, in this experiment, the majority
of participants showed similar patterns of judgments about the comical-
ity of the stimuli, and those who exhibit different patterns were mainly
males, so it also possible that gender differences could play a role in our
results, although further tests should be necessary to clarify this issue.
Finally, we should notice thatwhile paired comparisons allow inves-
tigating even small differences in the perception of a given attribute of
interest (in this case the comicality value of the different stimuli), the
scaling results are only relative, and not absolute. In other words, paired
comparisons do not speak about the degree to which the stimuli were
actually considered funny, and it is possible that even those which
were considered more comical, were still actually not funny.
3. Experiment 2: the role of temporal contingency
In Experiment 2 we investigated the role that temporal contingency
in perceptual causality plays in evoking comic impressions in the ob-
servers. According to our main hypothesis, derived from the Bergsonian
theory, the incongruity emerging from the juxtaposition of a living be-
haviour inside a mechanical event (mechanical causal relation) should
look funny. In this experiment we manipulated the duration of the
pause at the impact between the two squares, in order to checkwhether
comic impressions are speciﬁcally dependent on the temporal con-
straints of perceptual causality (Schlottmann & Anderson, 1993) and
whether they are preserved even when the two movements are no
longer perceived as causally related but only as a sequence of two
successive moving objects, independent from each other. It is in fact
known that ratings of causality decrease with increasing delays
between the two movements (Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992), even if
small delays actually yield better impressions of causality than nodelays
(Michotte, 1946/1963; Parovel & Casco, 2006).
Furthermore, introducing a negative temporal interval between the
twomovements (i.e. making the second square start moving before it is
touched by the ﬁrst square), we replicated one crucial condition for the
“intentional reaction” event (Kanizsa, 1991; Kanizsa & Vicario, 1968) or
“psychological causality” (Schlottmann et al., 2002; Schlottmann et al.,
2006), in which the second moving object appears to be “escaping” or
“running away” just before the arrival of the ﬁrst one.
A ﬁnal aim of the experiment was to isolate the effect of trajectory
cues of animacy from the one of velocity. More speciﬁcally, we wanted
to test whether an animal-like trajectory would remain comical even
with a lower speed value, by using a speed that was intermediate
between the two speed values adopted in Experiment 1.
Moreover, to get absolute and not only relative values of comicality,
after gathering the responses in the pairwise comparisons, we asked to




Participantswere 28 university students (22 females). Themean age
of the participants was 25.9 years (SD = 7.2 years). All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
3.2. Design and stimuli
The stimuli were generated as variations of some of the stimuli used
in Experiment 1 by manipulating two factors: (a) the trajectory of the
movement of the second square (2 levels: linear or frog-like), and
(b) the temporal delay between the end of the movement of the ﬁrst
square, and the beginning of the movement of the second square (4
levels: −200 ms, +30 ms, +200 ms, +1000 ms). The speed of the
two squares was the same (6.3°/s). Please note that when the delay
was negative the second square started to move before the end of the
movement of the ﬁrst square.
The experiment included a total of 28 forced-choice trials, consisting
of all the pairwise comparisons of 8 stimuli. Each trial was presented
only once to contain the duration of the experiment, and prevent partic-
ipants to become bored by the task, as it is reasonable to assume that
boredom could inﬂuence their perception of comicality. The order of
the stimuli in the paired comparisonswashowever balanced across par-
ticipants (i.e. given the pair of stimuli A and B, Awas presented before B
to half the participants, and after B to the remaining observers). The
trials were presented in randomized order in a single block.
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3.2.1. Procedure
The procedure for presenting the movies and gathering the
responses in the pairwise comparisons was the same as in the ﬁrst
experiment. In addition, at the end of the experimental session subjects
were asked to rate the perceived comicality of each stimulus on a
7-point Likert scale, where 7 refers to the strongest comic impression.
Spontaneous reports and descriptions of the animations were also
solicited and recorded by the experimenter.
3.3. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, paired comparisons were analysed using the
Thurstone–Mosteller scaling method. After an initial inspection of the
rating data and of the recorded post-experiment subjective reports,
data coming from two participants were excluded from the analysis.
One had reported that the two squares always appeared to him like a
pair of eyes, the other reported ﬁnding the frog-like trajectory “very
disturbing”. The model ﬁtted on the data for all the remaining partici-
pants revealed good ﬁt, and signiﬁcant differences between the stimuli
perceived comicality values [G2(21) = 11.6; p = 0.95]. No signiﬁcant
differences were found between females and males, nor the age of
participants was found to affect the comicality scale values.
The results of the scaling are plotted in Fig. 5(a) as function of trajec-
tory and temporal delay between the end of the movement of the ﬁrst
square and the beginning of the movement of the second square. The
plots clearly reveal two main patterns. On the one hand, in the scale
values there is a clear tendency towards decrease as the temporal
delay increases. On the other hand, for each given level of temporal
delay, the comicality value is greater for the frog-like trajectory than
for the linear trajectory.
The analysis of the individual scale values revealed again a good
amount of variability, albeit with signiﬁcant preferences for basically
all participants. Clearly, however, given the limited amount of data
available for ﬁtting each model, the reliability of these individual scale
values is poor. Moreover, in several cases some stimuli were never cho-
sen, resulting in singularities in the contingency tables from which the
models were to be estimated, and further limiting the accuracy of
scaling.
In Fig. 5(b) the average comicality ratings of the stimuli are plotted,
once again as function of temporal delay and trajectory. As the ﬁgure
shows, the same clear trends found in the scale values are present
here. A 3-way ANOVA including 2 within-subject factors (temporal
delay and trajectory) and one between-subject factor (sex) conducted
on the ratings data revealed signiﬁcant main effects of both the
within-subject factors [temporal delay: F(3,81)=28.12; p b 0.0001; tra-
jectory: F(1,27)=12.69; p b 0.01], but no signiﬁcant effect of sexnor any
signiﬁcant interaction. The average ratings for all the stimuli are report-
ed in Table 1, along with their standard deviations. As it can be seen in
the table, not only the pattern of ratings means is consistent with the
one of scale values, but the comicality ratings of stimuli with the highest
scale values (such as the ones with frog-like trajectory and negative or
no temporal delay) fall towards the higher end of the rating scale, indi-
cating the participants indeed considered them pretty funny, not only
more funny the other ones the were presented with.
To further check the consistency between scale values and ratings,
we computed, for each participant, the Pearson's correlation between
scale values and ratings. Correlations were signiﬁcant for 15 of 26
subjects,6 and ranged from −0.74 to 0.91, but only two participants
showed negative correlations (respectively −0.11 and −0.74). In
Fig. 5(c) the histogram of the correlations is plotted, in absolute value.
In the majority of cases correlations were clearly moderate (|r| N 0.5)
or strong (|r| N .8).
Overall, these results show that temporal contingency has a strong
inﬂuence in eliciting a comic impression. Comicality scale values and
ratings, in fact, tended to decrease with increasing delay, up to the
point that with a 1 s delay, scale values were lowest and, more impor-
tantly, ratings indicated a breakdown of the comic effect.
The role of animacy cues (i.e. animal-like motion) in prompting a
funny impression is also conﬁrmed: the frog-like trajectory was in fact
always preferred to the linear trajectory, even when the causal relation
was actuallyweakened.With a 200ms temporal delay, it is still possible
to get an impression of causality: with the linear trajectory, however,
the event is no longer judged comic, while with the frog-like trajectory
absolute ratings still display a comic effect.
On the other hand, when spatiotemporal conditions convey an im-
pression of psychological causality (−200 ms delay), as the second
moving object looks as if it is escaping before the arrival of the ﬁrst,
even linear trajectories events are judged amusing (ratings = 4.5).
4. Experiment 3: animal-like versus mechanical-like trajectories
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 showed that a perceptual incongru-
ity between the two movements in the launching paradigm, based on
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Fig. 5. Plots of the comicality scale values (a) and of the average comicality ratings (b) of the 8 stimuli in Experiment 2, as function of temporal delay (between the end of theﬁrstmovement
and the beginning of the second) and trajectory. Circles represent linear trajectory, and triangles frog-like trajectory. Error bars represent conﬁdence intervals. (c) Histogram of the corre-
lations (in absolute value) between scale values and ratings for each participant.
6 Given that each correlation was computed with only 8 pairs, one for each stimulus,
statistical tests of the Pearson's coefﬁcients have a very limited power.
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appreciation. Animacy cues appear to be related to the animal-like fea-
tures of the secondmovement, or to high speed values, or to a negative
temporal delay between the two movements.
The third experimentwas carried out to see if an incongruous launch
effect in which the trajectory of the secondmoving object is incoherent
with respect to the trajectory of the ﬁrst, but it does not display animal-
like features, still generates an amusing impression or, instead, aweaker
comic impression, as found by Bressanelli and Parovel (2012). We test-
ed this hypothesis by matching the animal-like trajectories (frog-like
and rabbit-like) of the previous experiments with two mechanical-like
trajectories: a bouncing-like movement, as falling repeatedly after a
step, and a rotating movement, like a spinning wheel.
We were thus able to directly compare the strength of comic appre-
ciations produced by different kinds of incongruent causal events: some
based on the presence of animal-like trajectories and others based on
more passive mechanical-like trajectories outgoing after the impact.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Participantswere 28 university students (17 females). Themean age
of the participants was 26.2 years (SD = 5.2 years). All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
4.2. Design and stimuli
The stimuli have been generated by manipulating two factors:
(a) the trajectory of the second moving object (4 levels: frog-like and
rabbit-like; bouncing-like and clockwise rotating, see Fig. 6), and
(b) the speed (2 levels: 12.6°/s and 6.3°/s). The length of the
bouncing-like trajectorywas 3.4° and the length of the rotating trajecto-
ry was 2.8°; the other two stimuli are identical of those adopted in
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 2, the experiment included a total of
28 forced-choice trials, consisting of all the pairwise comparisons of 8
stimuli. The order of the stimuli in the paired comparisonswas balanced
across participants. The trials were presented in randomized order in a
single block.
4.2.1. Procedure
The procedure for presenting the stimuli, and gathering the
responses was the same as in the previous experiment. Moreover, just
as in the second experiment, at the end of the experimental session
subjects were asked to rate the perceived comicality of each stimulus
on a 7-point Likert scale. Spontaneous reports and descriptions of the
animations were again solicited and recorded by the experimenter.
4.3. Results and discussion
Comicality scale values were computed from paired comparisons
data, as in the previous experiments. No signiﬁcant differences were
found between males and females, nor age was found to have a signiﬁ-
cant effect. The likelihood-ratio test indicates ﬁt between the expected
scale values and the collected data [G2(21) = 20.5, p = 0.49]. Scale
values are plotted in Fig. 6(a) as function of trajectory and speed. The
plot seems to show that only one conﬁguration was judged clearly
more comical than the others: the condition inwhich the second square
moved fast on a rabbit-like trajectory. There does not seem to be much
difference between the comicality values of most of the other stimuli.
Conversely to what previously found, moreover, speed seems to affect
perceived comicality only with rabbit-like and bouncing trajectories.
Average ratings for each stimulus were also computed aggregating
across participants, and are plotted in Fig. 6(d), and reported in
Table 2, along with their standard deviations. As the plots show, the
results closely mirror the ones derived from paired comparisons. An
Table 1
Average comicality ratings for the stimuli in Experiment 2.





−200 4.5 (1.35) 5.6 (1.1)
0 3.9 (1.57) 5 (1.52)
200 3.04 (1.48) 4.2 (1.6)
1000 2.3 (1.44) 3.6 (2.1)
Fig. 6. Schematic illustrations of the stimuli adopted in Experiment 3: (a) the rabbit-like
trajectory; (b) the frog-like trajectory; (c) the bouncing-like trajectory; and (d) the clock-
wise rotating trajectory.
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analysis of variance revealed signiﬁcant differences due to the trajectory
[F(3,81) = 12.19; p b 0.0001] and the speed [F(1,27) = 49.26;
p b 0.0001] of the second square, as well as a signiﬁcant interaction be-
tween the factors [F(3,81)= 3.44; p b 0.05]. Planned comparisons con-
ﬁrmed that ratings for rabbit-like trajectory were signiﬁcantly higher
than ratings for the other trajectories [t(27) = 7.31; p b 0.0001]. For
each trajectory, except the rabbit-like one, ratings were signiﬁcantly
higher for high speed than for low speed (p b 0.01).
Subjective reports collected at the end of the sessions, however, re-
vealed that a subset of participants had strongly disliked or had been
annoyed by the frog-like trajectory.We thus decided to perform further
analyses on the rating data, with the aim of identifying cluster of
subjects. A hierarchical clustering using Ward's procedure on a GDM2
distancematrix7 cut at 1.1 yielded two clusters, comprising respectively
18 and 10 subjects. Scale values were then recomputed for each cluster,
aswell as average ratings for each stimulus (aggregating across the sub-
jects in the cluster). The ﬁt of the scales values to the collected data was
good for the ﬁrst cluster [G2(21) = 12.56, p = 0.92], better than the ﬁt
of the model ﬁtted on the data from all the subjects, and moderate for
the second one [G2(21) = 28.08, p = 0.14].
In Fig. 7(b) and (c) comicality scale values for the different clusters
are plotted. As it can be easily seen comparing the plots for the two clus-
ters, the main difference seems relative to the frog-like conditions:
while for cluster 2 these conditions were judged the least comical
stimuli, participants in the other cluster seemed to consider them
quite comical, as in the previous experiments. A second difference
between the clusters seems to be in the perceived comicality of the
bouncing situation, which was greater in cluster 2 than in cluster 1,
particularly at the lower speed. Finally, the two clusters differed in
that the intermediate-speed rabbit-like trajectory was judged more
comical by subjects in cluster 2 than by those in cluster 1.
Similar differences between the clusters are also clear in the rating
plots (Fig. 7c, f). Not surprisingly, given that the ratings themselves
had been used for ﬁnding clusters, differences between the groups are
even more evident than in the scale values plots. Overall, the pattern
of rating means show that for cluster 1, rabbit-like and frog-like
trajectories were considered more comical than the other ones
[t(17) = 5.81; p b 0.0001], and were the only trajectories for which
the average ratings were above themid-point of the scale. Interestingly,
no signiﬁcant differences were found for this cluster between the rat-
ings for the frog-like and those for the rabbit-like trajectory. As for the
second cluster, the pattern of means and the analysis show that both
rabbit-like and bouncing-trajectories were rated as more comical than
the other ones, and above themid-point of the rating scale. The average
ratings for each stimulus in the two clusters are reported in rightmost
columns of Table 2 along with standard deviations.
Overall, the results of Experiment 3 showed that animal-like trajec-
tories are judged more amusing than mechanical-like trajectories. The
hypothesis formulated by Bergson is well supported by these data: a
surprising trajectory after the collision can be a sufﬁcient condition for
a comic event, but the presence of animacy cues signiﬁcantly enhances
the probability of being comical. Speed too, as in the previous experi-
ments, produces a signiﬁcant effect, in all the stimulus conditions:
the faster the movements, the bigger the comic evaluation. In the
bouncing-like event (Fig. 6a), the high speed value is related to good
impression of comicality. These results can be understood, according
to the descriptions given by the participants, as a change from a passive
motion of the object to a self-propelled motion, due to the high speed.
Individual variability was found, as in Experiment 2, both at the level
of the scale values and of the ratings. In this experiment, however, a
more systematic pattern of variability was found in both types of data,
polarized upon two opposite perceptions of the frog-like stimuli.
While the majority of participants considered it comical, consistently
with the results of the previous experiments, some really disliked it,
rating it almost every time at the bottom end of the Likert scale.
It is not clear whywe did not observe the same pattern in the previ-
ous experiments, given that the frog-like trajectory was always includ-
ed. We actually did ﬁnd, in Experiment 2, at least two participants
showing the same attitude towards this conﬁguration, which might
have something to do with latent subjective variables that were not
considered in the study (e.g. personality or cultural factors). According
to the literature, in facts, individual differences play a role in humour
appreciation, as they can affect the identiﬁcation of those variables in-
volved both in structural properties either in content of the joke
(Ruch, 2001). In our experimental stimuli, for instance, the frog-like
trajectory has been described from the subjects who disliked it as a
deformation of the square, like a strained stripe. About personality
correlates of humour appreciation, themost potent predictor of humour
appreciation seems to be conservatism: more conservative individuals
dislike novel, unfamiliar, incongruous events and prefer stimuli which
are simpler, more familiar and congruent (Ruch, 2001). Further studies
would be needed to investigate this issue in more depth.
5. General discussion
This research suggests that incongruity, a crucial determinant of hu-
mour, as ﬁrmly established in cognition (Berger, 2010; Koestler, 1964;
Martin, 2007; Polimeni & Reiss, 2006), can be observed and psycho-
physically investigated also in low-level processed visual events like
causality and animacy (Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000),
by considering the comic appreciation as a qualitative dependent
variable (see also Visch & Tan, 2009).
The results of our experiments generally show that the introduction
of animal-like trajectories (frog-like and rabbit-like movements) in the
second part of the causal paradigm, i.e. after the contact between the
two squares, signiﬁcantly increases the impression of comicality
(Experiments 1, 2 and 3). It is also clear that the animal-like movement
is not itself responsible of generating a comic appreciation, but the
inclusion of animacy in a causal structure is: in fact, by increasing the
temporal delay between the two movements, the impression of
comicality signiﬁcantly decreases (Experiment 2). This is also consistent
with the results by Visch and Tan (2009), which found that animacy
ratings of short movies were not correlated with funniness ratings.
Even linear trajectories, on the other hand, are appropriate in getting
a funny impression of paradoxical social causality when the spatiotem-
poral organization does not followNewtonian principles, as reported by
Michotte (1946/1963): in particular when the second movement is
faster that the ﬁrst, as in the trigger effect (Experiment 1), and also
when there is a negative delay (−200 ms) between the two move-
ments (Experiment 2), and the second object seems to escape from
the ﬁrst (Kanizsa, 1991; Kanizsa & Vicario, 1968).
Also, the ﬁndings reveal a constant effect of speed in intensifying the
amusing effect of animacy cues, both those related on the shape of the
trajectories and those related on the spatiotemporal conditions,
Table 2
Average comicality ratings of the stimuli in Experiment 3. Ratings reported are averaged
across all participants and across participants in the two clusters separately.






Rotating Low 3.2 (1.1) 3.5 (1.04) 2.7 (1.06)
High 4.2 (1.25) 4.4 (0.98) 3.8 (1.62)
Bouncing Low 3.6 (1.59) 3.2 (1.46) 4.5 (1.51)
High 4.7 (1.48) 4.2 (1.44) 5.7 (1.06)
Frog-like Low 4.1 (2.02) 5 (1.61) 2.4 (1.58)
High 4.5 (2.12) 5.4 (1.69) 2.8 (1.75)
Rabbit-like Low 5.3 (1.05) 5.4 (0.98) 5.1 (1.2)
High 6.5 (0.79) 6.6 (0.78) 6.3 (0.82)
7 Walesiak & Dudek, 2010.
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plausibly conﬁrming a relationship between speed and animacy as sug-
gested by Szego and Rutherford (2007) and by Visch and Tan (2009).
Furthermore, in matching the animal-like with the mechanical-like
movements (bouncing and rotating trajectories) after the causal
collision, data showed that the ﬁrst ones are generally deemed more
amusing than the second ones (Experiment 3), as previously suggested
by Bressanelli and Parovel (2012).
5.1. Conclusions
Ourmainﬁndings support our hypothesis that the launch-effect par-
adigm, introduced by Michotte (1946/1963), is an extremely effective
experimental paradigm in generating incongruous events and in isolat-
ing and systematically exploring the perceptual variables potentially
relevant in prompting spontaneous comic impressions, such as the
presence of different animacy cues.
To summarize, the paradoxical juxtaposition of a living behaviour
in a mechanical structure (in our research, animacy cues inside a
cause–effect perceptual relationship), seems to be a powerful factor in
eliciting comic appreciations, totally in line with the Bergsonian
perspective in particular, and with incongruity theories in general.
We draw the conclusion that comic impressions can be genuinely
triggered by means of speciﬁc spatiotemporal conﬁgurations, obtained
by manipulating perceptual causality and animacy to get incongruent
and surprising causal contingencies. Like causality and animacy, these
paradoxical events hold the same compelling evidence and surprising
character of many perceptual illusions and other paradoxical visual
phenomena, and can be systematically measured and explored with
psychophysical methods.
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